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Criminal Law:
The Institutional Design of Punishment1
Aaron Rappaport
Over the past 40 years, the United States has experienced an
extraordinary transformation in the institutional design of its
punishment systems. Many states, along with the federal government,
have shifted from indeterminate sentencing models (in which courts
and parole boards wield principal authority) to determinate systems (in
which legislators and sentencing commissions have principal power).
This shift has been called one of the most important changes in federal
judging in more than 50 years.2
Whether the institutional transformation is a good one remains the
source of heated debate. But noticeably lacking from the discussion is
any sustained effort to examine the institutional design of punishment
from a theoretical point of view, and specifically to explore the
underlying morality of different institutional schemes. This chapter
summarizes the first sustained attempt to explore the relationship
between moral theory and institutional design in the punishment field.
The effort must confront one immediate obstacle—a persistent lack
of agreement over the appropriate moral theory governing punishment
decisions. Two moral theories dominate the field—utilitarianism and
retribution—along with hybrid versions that meld the two. The choice
among these moral theories has proved endlessly controversial, and no
accepted methodology exists to resolve the dispute.
The controversy over moral premises need not be an insuperable
obstacle, however. Rather than trying to identify the “correct” moral
principle, an alternative approach would be to assess the institutional
ramifications of each moral theory in turn. The result would be a
menu of design options, each associated with a different moral
principle.
This approach would confront retributivists and
utilitarians, in turn, with the institutional ramifications of their
favored moral outlook. This chapter summarizes the first step toward
this approach by exploring the institutional ramifications of one
dominant principle of punishment: utilitarianism. The hope is that the

1. Summarized and excerpted from Aaron J. Rappaport, The Institutional
Design of Punishment, 60 ARIZ. L. REV. 913 (2018).
2. Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y.
L.J. 2 (Feb. 11, 1992).
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effort will inspire others to examine the institutional implications of
other moral theories in the punishment field.
So which institutional structure is best suited for promoting
utilitarian goals? Such an institution must possess two essential
qualities: It must be committed to promoting utilitarian goals, and it
must be capable of carrying out the relevant analysis consistently and
competently over time. Among sentencing institutions, which comes
closest to satisfying both requirements?
I. Commitment to Utilitarian Goals
Commitment to the utilitarian enterprise is a critical requirement.
An institution that fails to adopt the moral principle of utilitarianism,
and thus embraces theories such as retribution, will be utilitymaximizing only by accident. Thus, the institutional designer must
consider whether an entity’s structure might influence its choice of
moral goals. This idea—that institutional structure can affect goal
selection—might seem surprising. But recent research in moral
psychology identifies structural features that tend to encourage the
adoption of a utilitarian orientation.
A. Cognitive Science and Institutional Design
Much of the new research focuses on how human beings make
moral judgments—specifically, why the very same individuals
sometimes make judgments aligned with consequentialist theories (like
utilitarianism) and at other times reach decisions more consistent with
nonconsequentialist or “deontological” theories (like retributivism). A
common research strategy has been to pose moral dilemmas (such as
the famous “trolley” problem) to individuals and study how the
participants react. These studies are supplemented by MRI tests
applied to individuals while they make moral decisions.
Drawing from such research, Professor Joshua Greene argues that
human beings have two different mental processes for reasoning about
moral matters—one more closely associated with consequentialist
thinking; the other aligned with nonconsequentialist approaches.3

3. See Joshua Greene et al., Embedding Ethical Principles in Collective
Decision Support Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH AAAI
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 4147 (2016); Joshua Greene,
Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive (Neuro)Science Matters for
Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695 (2014); JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES (2013).
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These processes take place in different parts of the brain, suggesting
different biological mechanisms for each.
They also operate in very different ways. For example, the
nonconsequentialist process appears to require a smaller degree of
effort and, perhaps as a result, operates at a faster speed. That helps
explain why individuals, when given moral dilemmas under stress or
time constraints, tend to favor deontological decisions. By contrast,
utilitarian considerations become more prevalent when participants are
given greater opportunities for reflection and deliberation.
From these and related studies, Greene concludes that the
deontological mechanism operates as an intuitive, fast-operating
process, one that occurs automatically without any conscious thinking.
By contrast, the consequentialist process is a slower, more
methodological process requiring more effort. This “dual-process
theory,” as Greene calls it, rests on a wealth of supporting data; it will
serve as our working hypothesis going forward concerning how
individuals make moral decisions.
The empirical research suggests that various aspects of the
decisionmaker’s environment might influence which of the two
cognitive processes is favored. Three factors in particular appear to be
significant: the emotional vibrancy of the decision; the individual’s
scope of responsibility; and the decisionmaker’s opportunities for
deliberation and reflection. These factors provide a set of criteria for
assessing which institution is most likely to adopt a utilitarian goal.
First, the emotional vibrancy of a decision is probably the central
factor influencing moral deliberation. Emotions play a major role in
deontological thinking. Strongly held emotions of anger and disgust,
among others, are associated with intuitive desires to punish violators
or help victims, and thus they increase the likelihood that an individual
will adopt nonconsequentialist ways of thinking.
By contrast,
consequentialist thinking tends to be more deliberative, abstract, and
cognitive. Thus, where individuals are able to moderate their
emotional responses and consider decisions more abstractly, utilitarian
considerations are favored.
These observations have implications for institutional design.
Perhaps most notably, they suggest that, to promote utilitarian thinking,
an institution should be designed in a way that creates some emotional
distance from specific offenders and their concrete crimes. The most
feasible way to achieve that result is to ensure that an institution
addresses a sentencing question in the abstract rather than in the context
of a specific individual’s case. All else being equal, entities, like juries,
that confront defendants more directly are more likely to react in an
intuitive, retributive manner. Conversely, institutions that have some
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distance from the sentencing decision, such as sentencing commissions,
are more likely to adopt a utilitarian framework.
A second relevant factor concerns the scope of the decisionmaker’s
responsibilities. According to preliminary research, individuals who
have a society-wide perspective may be more likely to take into
account the broader costs and benefits of a decision, while individuals
who are narrowly focused on one individual tend to react in a more
intuitive, moralizing way.
These results have implications for the punishment field, as well.
Certain sentencing institutions, such as the legislature, possess a
system-wide perspective; their responsibility, in a sense, is for society
at large. Others, like judges, are principally focused on an individual
criminal case. The implication is that, for a utilitarian, sentencing
authority should be given to institutional actors with the broader,
system-wide perspective because they are more likely to adopt a
consequentialist approach to punishment decisions.
Finally, cognitive research suggests that the decisionmaker’s
opportunities for reflection can affect his or her moral orientation.
When required to make decisions under time constraints or with other
stressors, individuals default to automatic and intuitive nonconsequentialist
thinking. Conversely, some evidence indicates that efforts to promote
deliberation and increase accountability may encourage a more
reflective approach conducive to utilitarian thinking.
Institutions can be structured to promote a more reflective
decisionmaking environment. For example, establishing a multimember
decisionmaking panel or commission can increase the likelihood that
the members deliberate over various policy options. Mandating a
period of time for input from affected individuals, requiring actors to
consider those comments, and demanding that the officials issue a
statement of reasons for their decisions would also help. All of
these features should be considered because they can be helpful in
calming the emotions of the punishment decision, thus promoting
consequentialist thinking.
The research into moral psychology provides a general blueprint
for constructing an institution that will tend to encourage utilitarian
values. Such an institution should be responsible for promulgating
general sentencing rules rather than for imposing punishments on
specific individuals; should have a system-wide perspective on
punishment decisions, including a responsibility to consider the
interests of the community at large; and should be subject to procedures
that encourage reflection and deliberation. Of the five traditional
institutions of punishment—juries, judges, legislatures, parole boards,
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and sentencing commissions—only the Sentencing Commission
satisfies these three requirements to any significant respect.
B. Utilitarianism and Institutional Commitments
Sentencing Commissions possess a structure that is particularly
hospitable to consequentialist thinking. The legislature, of course,
possesses similar structural features, including the focus on general
sentencing rules and system-wide perspectives. Yet the legislature’s
appeal is undercut by its political sensitivity to the passions of the
public, which lead to emotion-driven decisionmaking. Do sentencing
commissions suffer from the same defect? Some certainly do. One of
the central critiques of the U.S. Sentencing Commission has been that it
is insufficiently insulated from the political branches. But not all
commissions are vulnerable to such a critique. Nothing makes them
inherently political or apolitical. Rather, the degree of political
insulation they possess is largely dependent on each commission’s
specific structure.
Perhaps the most important structural feature of political influence
concerns how commission members are appointed to or removed from
office. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, for example, has several
membership rules designed to curb political influence. These rules
establish long terms in office, require Senate confirmation for all
nominations, permit no more than four of the seven members to be
drawn from the same political party, permit removal only for cause, and
require staggered appointments to the commission (to prevent the
appointment of all commission members during the same Presidential
term). All of these features give the Commission some insulation from
political pressures.
Another critical area of insulation concerns who can be appointed
to a sentencing commission. Commissioners must be appointed who
are not overly dependent on, or subservient to, the political branches.
Appropriately crafted membership requirements can promote that goal.
To give one obvious approach, a commission that is comprised of lifetenured officials would have a much greater degree of political
insulation—comparable to that of the federal judiciary. Thus, one
approach to ensure a high degree of independence would be to require
that all sentencing commission members be life-tenured judges and
appointed to the commission for life (or at least very long terms).
This approach, of course, would not entirely eliminate the role of
politics in the commission’s rulemaking. Even life-tenured judges have
political allegiances, and they may desire higher offices within the
judiciary or elsewhere. As a practical matter, moreover, the sentencing
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commission is dependent on the legislature for funding and its
autonomy. Thus, the commission must be wary of making decisions
that could trigger a legislative backlash. Nonetheless, one might hope
that, over time, a relatively independent commission will accrue
sufficient political capital to withstand the inevitable pressures
generated by the political branches. In doing so, it will be able to fulfill
its ultimate role as a broadly independent institution within the
sentencing system.
In sum, the sentencing-commission model has certain appealing
features that make it relatively well-designed to promote utilitarian
goals. Like the legislature, it possesses the emotional distance and
system-wide perspective that are conducive of utilitarian goals. In
contrast to the legislature, though, the commission can be structured to
reduce the influence of political pressure. The result is an entity wellsuited for promoting utilitarian goals, or at least better suited than its
rivals.
II. The Competence of Sentencing Institutions
Commitment to utilitarian goals is not alone sufficient to ensure
that an institution achieves utilitarian objectives. The institution must
also be capable of carrying out the utilitarian cost-benefit analysis
consistently and accurately over time. Thus, the institutional designer
must also consider the kinds of institutional skills necessary to carry
out that analysis effectively.
A. Key Criteria of Competence
Three qualities will be essential—technical expertise, an expansive
sense of empathy, and political impartiality.
A sentencing institution must possess a degree of technical
expertise. Attempts to assess the public-safety benefits of a sentencing
decision will inevitably involve complex judgments about the deterrent
effect of punishment, the risk of recidivism, and the rehabilitative
potential of the defendant. Similarly, attempts to assess the public costs
of punishment will require some understanding of government
finances, including the financial costs associated with the courts,
police, prison, and other entities within the criminal justice system.
A second competence might be classified as a human, rather than
technical, skill. It is the ability to empathize with human beings who
may be very different from the decisionmaker. The utilitarian calculus,
after all, requires consideration of the private costs of punishment,

2019]

The Judges’ Book

59

which means a decisionmaker must be willing and able to take into
account the suffering of a defendant sentenced to prison. Empathy
requires the decisionmaker, then, to see the essential human worth of
every defendant, despite the offender’s possibly egregious acts.
A sentencing institution must also be able to employ these skills
without being unduly influenced by political pressure or public opinion.
Given the turbulent political environment and passions surrounding
crime and punishment today, the ability to maintain any kind of
independence is inevitably difficult. The unfortunate result is a
skewing of sentencing decisions. Political pressure can lead an
institution to overstate public benefits or understate the private costs of
a sentencing decision, resulting in excessive penalties. To ensure an
impartial assessment of the interests at stake, a sentencing institution
must be insulated to some degree from the political passions swirling
through the criminal-justice field.
These three competences—technical expertise, empathy, and
impartiality—are the essential skills of a utilitarian sentencing
institution. Lacking those skills, an institution’s decisions will be based
on speculation or, worse, political influence or bias.
B. Assessing the Competence of Sentencing Institutions
Which of the punishment institutions have all three of these skills
to a significant degree? Again, only one: a well-designed sentencing
commission.
Sentencing commissions can possess significant technical skill in
assessing the public-safety effects of punishment. Commissions are
commonly conceived as expert agencies charged with taking into
account the latest research on punishment. Further, sentencing
commissions can adopt a broad, system-wide approach that encourages
consideration of the full range of public-safety concerns. In some
jurisdictions, commissions are staffed with highly trained experts,
including statisticians and other research scientists.
The primary obstacle commissions face in assessing the public
benefits of punishment has been the “shortfall in quality research on the
effectiveness of criminal sanctions in reducing crime.”4 Nonetheless,
sentencing commissions are well-positioned to make the best use of the
available information. And, in some jurisdictions, commissions are
tasked with actively promoting and supporting new research initiatives.

4.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 6A.01 (Tentative Draft #1, 2007).
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Turning to the public costs of crime, sentencing commissions
appear to have comparable advantages. An effective institution must
account for the full range of costs incurred by the government,
including the costs of prison, correctional personnel, and the court
system. An institution like the commission—with its system-wide
perspective and with some expertise in accounting and related
disciplines—will be able to gather and analyze these various data
streams. The agency is also positioned to take account of cost issues
relating to prison capacity. Sentencing commissions may not yet fulfill
these tasks with complete success—anecdotal evidence suggests that
commissions look at the cost side only occasionally—but the institution
is the candidate with the best potential to carry out the task effectively.
The sentencing commission’s ability to assess the private costs of
punishment is more questionable. Like legislatures, commissions
operate at a distance from individual offenders, potentially leading
agency members to treat offenders as abstractions, without the full
appreciation for the unique self-worth of the lives at stake. This danger
can be mitigated somewhat by appropriately crafted membership rules.
For example, a commission comprised of a panel of trial judges would
be far less vulnerable to this critique. Trial judges have extensive
experience confronting offenders in their ordinary sentencing decisions.
One might hope that this experience would ensure that judges
understand that they are dealing not with abstractions, but with real
human beings.
The final consideration in assessing the commission’s competence
is its ability to weigh the public and private interests in an impartial,
unbiased way. How does the commission fare on this metric? Some
say not particularly well. Commissions have been criticized for being
overly political.
Justice Scalia famously denounced the U.S.
Sentencing Commission for being merely a “junior varsity Congress.”5
Despite this critique, it is a mistake to conclude that sentencing
commissions are inherently sensitive to political pressure. The degree
of independence they enjoy depends on their structure and membership.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission already possesses several
structural features—such as removal only for cause—that help ensure a
degree of political insulation. Requiring all commission members to be
life-tenured judges would dramatically strengthen that insulation. This
change would not eliminate all political influence, but, over time, as the
Commission gains legitimacy and political capital, it will have further
leeway to act on its own judgments without interference.
5. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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This analysis suggests that a properly structured sentencing
commission—one that is comprised of life-tenured trial judges—would
be well-equipped to weigh the costs and benefits of punishment.
Unlike the legislature, such a commission would neither overstate the
public interests of punishment nor give short shrift to public or private
costs. Unlike the judiciary, it would not be tempted to neglect public
interests in its focus on private ones. Such a sentencing commission
would represent the best option among the traditional sentencing
institutions. Of course, the appeal of a sentencing commission depends
fundamentally on how it is structured. To gain the full benefits of a
commission, appropriate institutional safeguards must protect the
commission from the inevitable political pressures that will be brought
to bear on it over time.
Conclusion
Some might disagree with some of the empirical assumptions
made here. Questioning those assumptions is entirely appropriate, and
further research is unquestionably needed to ensure that the analysis is
grounded in data rather than anecdote. Others might disagree with the
analysis on a more fundamental level by rejecting the moral premise of
utilitarianism. For them, this analysis will hopefully spur exploration
of the institutional ramifications of their preferred moral theory. The
ultimate goal of this effort goes beyond specific policy prescriptions. It
is to promote a more transparent debate about the moral assumptions of
institutional design, and to encourage individuals to be more reflective
about the bases for their own institutional preferences in the criminaljustice field.
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